The US and Pakistan

One of the hazards of being the big dog on the block is that everybody blames you. The main victims in Mumbai were Indian, or course, but the terrorist went to some trouble to make sure they killed Americans, Jews, and British. The Indians blame America as protectors and financiers of Pakistan.

Historically this is true, but the US alliance with Pakistan has never been a matter of our common allegiance to that old Hebrew War God, nor has it ever been more than a matter of current convenience. In the early years, when India tilted to the Russians in the cold war, Pakistan was a counterweight. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan was the vital staging area for the resistance. With 9/11, Pakistan was a country that needed to be kept on the sidelines of the Afghanistan struggle. Despite tens of billions in US aid, Pakistan has never been an effective ally against the Taliban, nor has it been able to keep its own state from perpetually teetering on the brink of political and economic collapse.

Despite all that, after repeated wars and almost wars, Pakistan and India in recent years made modest progress towards normalization of relations. This progress was only possible because cooler heads in India (business men, not politicians, for the most part) saw the threat that a failed Pakistani state posed. In one step, the Mumbai terrorists threw all that into gravest doubt. There are fewer cool heads in India than ever, and Pakistan is as close to collapse as it has been. The Lashkar-e-Taibba terrorists who are almost certainly behind the attack were created by the Pakistans ISI (and probably al Quaeda), but were disavowed by the government some time ago. Disavowed, but tolerated, never suppressed, and quite likely still with many friends high in the Pakistani government and military.

The ideal solution for the US and India would be for the Pakistani government to suppress, arrest and disband those organizations, but it is not clear that it has either the will or the means. It is far from clear that a government could survive a serious attempt to destroy the LeT, and not even clear that the military can. If the Pakistanis are willing to attempt it, the US should provide (very quiet) support.

What if it can't, or won't? The US, with modest but unacknowledged Pakistani tolerance can continue its robotic assassination program, and it is likely to get more capable with time. India may not have the capability and is unlikely to get any Pakistani tolerance, so its options are very limited.

US Neocon Robert Kagan proposes an international military campaign to deal with the militias. We know what a policy wizard he is. In any case, it's unlikely to work at any scale below a massive war of extermination (see, e.g., Israel's misadventures in Lebanon), and at that scale, vitually certain to draw a Pakistani response with nukes - against India, even if India is officially neutral.

The painful and humiliating option is for India to grimace and prepare to play defence for a long time. Meanwhile, a diplomatic and economic initiative should pressure Pakistan to at least take modest steps to rein in the LeT terrorists - and the US has to take the lead in this regard. Next, the flow of Saudi and other money to the various Islamic terrorists needs to be cut off. The current decline in oil prices means that the US now has more leverage with the Gulf States - the prime culprits - than it has had recently.

Finally, Iran needs to be reminded that if it has a dog in this fight it is not the Taliban or the LeT.

These aren't great or even good options, but I don't see any better, not for the US and not for India. Hotheads need to be reminded that just because a nuclear exchange hasn't happened yet doesn't mean it won't - in fact hot heads are exactly the things most likely to bring one about.