Pointless
There is absolutely no point to a draw down of five thousand troops in January, or 25,000 next April. We have already seen this stupid movie in 2003 and 2004. What we need is a coherent strategy with a plausibly achievable goal. There are few options and they are all bad.
A. We can get the heck out as fast as possible and let the devil take the hindmost - or at least the Iraqis. This risks genocide, regional war, and facilitates Iranian dominance. It does get our troops out of harm's way as quickly as possible.
B. We can replace the dysfunctional government of Iraq and try to reconstruct it on a more rational basis. This will involve overthrowing a democratically elected government, provoke much greater Iraqi enmity, and require at least twice as many American troops - probably requiring doubling or tripling the size of the Army. Costs will be astronomical, the commitment multi-generational, and prospects dim.
C. We can pull most of our troops out, leaving strike forces in Kuwait, Kurdistan and Basra, possibly encourage partition, and use air power to suppress large scale warfare. Large scale slaughter is nonetheless likely.
D. We can continue on the present course, bleeding and paying with no prospective end in sight, and little or no hope of resolution.
Each of these would be bad or more likely terrible. The bad and terrible stuff would not be a result of the path chosen today, but of the path chosen in 2003.
Anybody have any bright ideas?
A. We can get the heck out as fast as possible and let the devil take the hindmost - or at least the Iraqis. This risks genocide, regional war, and facilitates Iranian dominance. It does get our troops out of harm's way as quickly as possible.
B. We can replace the dysfunctional government of Iraq and try to reconstruct it on a more rational basis. This will involve overthrowing a democratically elected government, provoke much greater Iraqi enmity, and require at least twice as many American troops - probably requiring doubling or tripling the size of the Army. Costs will be astronomical, the commitment multi-generational, and prospects dim.
C. We can pull most of our troops out, leaving strike forces in Kuwait, Kurdistan and Basra, possibly encourage partition, and use air power to suppress large scale warfare. Large scale slaughter is nonetheless likely.
D. We can continue on the present course, bleeding and paying with no prospective end in sight, and little or no hope of resolution.
Each of these would be bad or more likely terrible. The bad and terrible stuff would not be a result of the path chosen today, but of the path chosen in 2003.
Anybody have any bright ideas?
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